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Domestic Courts in International Law: 
The International Judicial Function of 
National Courts 
ANTONIOS TZANAKOPOULOS* 
I.  INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS OR DOMESTIC COURTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
Globalization has augmented the permeability of domestic legal 
orders, while at the same time it has led to a considerable increase in 
international regulation. It was only natural then that domestic courts 
would be faced ever more frequently with having to apply rules 
promulgated at the international level. This in turn has led to a 
proliferation of studies and projects as to how domestic courts deal with 
international law questions that arise, directly or incidentally, in the 
course of domestic proceedings.1 No doubt this is a very important, if 
 
* Lecturer in International Law, University College London and University of Glasgow 
[a.tzanakopoulos@ucl.ac.uk]. This paper served as the background paper for one of the panels at 
the symposium on “The International Judicial Function,” which took place in Amsterdam in 
March 2011. It is an evolution of the paper presented at the 4th Biennial ESIL Conference in 
Cambridge in September 2010 and published as Domestic Courts as the “Natural Judge” of 
International Law:  A Change in Physiognomy, in 3 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN 
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2012), from 
which it also draws in relevant parts. Many thanks are due to Lord Mance of the U.K. Supreme 
Court, Professors David D. Caron, Christian J. Tams, Jean d’Aspremont, and George Pavlakos, as 
well as to the participants in the Seminar on the International Judicial Function and in Agora 12 
of the 4th Biennial ESIL Conference for their comments on earlier incarnations of this paper. 
Further comments are invited and may be directed at the address above. The usual disclaimer 
applies.  
 1. One could cite, by way of example, the study by SHAHEED FATIMA, USING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS (2005; 2d ed. forthcoming 2012); the comparative 
study INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS:  INCORPORATION, 
TRANSFORMATION, AND PERSUASION (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011); the collective work 
CHALLENGING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS (August 
Reinisch ed., 2010); and the ACIL/OUP project and electronic database OXFORD REPORTS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS, http://www.oxfordlawreports.com (last visited Apr. 
23, 2012) [hereinafter ILDC]. These are only some of the most recent incarnations of the interest 
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very comparative research-intensive question. Yet in this article, the 
subject is not “international law in domestic courts,” but rather 
“domestic courts in international law”; that is to say, this article seeks to 
establish the position of domestic courts in the international legal order. 
The question is then whether domestic courts are assigned an 
international judicial function by international law, and whether they in 
fact assume and exercise that function.  
This necessarily leads to a consideration of what is an 
“international judicial function.” While this is a question of 
considerable complexity,2 the structure of the Project on International 
Courts and Tribunals’ symposium on “The International Judicial 
Function” can be employed as a guide to and a distillation of the main 
aspects of that function.3 These are:  the aspect of dispute resolution 
and/or law enforcement and the aspect of law-interpretation 
and/or -development. It should be clarified, however, that dispute 
settlement and enforcement form one single aspect, as judicial dispute 
settlement “is indeed a primary form of law enforcement.”4 Similarly, 
law-interpretation and law-development are but points on a spectrum—
only a thin line separates interpretation from “amendment.”5 This thin 
line is also notoriously difficult to pin down with any certainty.6 The 
task of fact-finding can be seen as necessarily included in these two 
 
on international law in domestic courts. Coming closer to the topic of this article is ANDRÉ 
NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW (2011). 
 2. For example, a whole doctoral thesis was recently devoted to analyzing how the ICJ 
understands its international judicial function:  GLEIDER I. HERNÁNDEZ, JUDICIAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS, JUDICIAL FUNCTION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
(forthcoming 2012). The ICJ itself has devoted considerable attention to elaborating its “judicial 
function,” particularly in the context of Advisory Opinions. Its judges have done this even more 
so in their relevant separate and dissenting opinions. 
 3. See Cesare P.R. Romano, Introduction, 34 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) 
(discussing the structure of the panels at the symposium). 
 4. Christian J. Tams, Enforcement, in MAKING TREATIES WORK:  HUMAN RIGHTS, 
ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL 391, 394 (Geir Ulfstein ed., 2007). Indeed it is instructive 
to compare two contributions under the very same title (albeit once in German), by Robert 
Jennings, The Judicial Enforcement of International Obligations, 47 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [ZAÖRV] (1987) 3 [hereinafter 
Jennings, International Obligations], and by Rudolf Bernhardt, Die gerichtliche Durchsetzung 
völkerrechtlicher Verpflichtungen, 47 ZAÖRV 17 (1987) (Ger.). The former deals primarily with 
enforcement of international judicial decisions, while the latter focuses on dispute settlement as 
judicial law enforcement. See Part III.A, infra.  
 5. See Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 1974–75 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 273, 277 [hereinafter Akehurst, Hierarchy of Sources]. 
 6. Cf. Gerrit Betlem & André Nollkaemper, Giving Effect to Public International Law and 
European Community Law Before Domestic Courts:  A Comparative Analysis of the Practice of 
Consistent Interpretation, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 569, 584 (2003).  
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fundamental aspects of the judicial function of a court, namely 
settlement/enforcement and interpretation/development, as it is their 
prerequisite.7 These two aspects constitute then the “core meaning” of 
the judicial function, according to the “common understanding” shared 
by international judicial institutions.8  
The two aspects are inseparable from each other.9 The resolution of 
a dispute and the enforcement of the law that will go with it cannot be 
divorced from the interpretation and potential development of the law 
being applied. Since every norm may be able to sustain a number of 
possible interpretations, its application by the judge in the case before 
her in effect leads to the authoritative selection of one of the possible 
interpretations, making law for the specific case.10 As such, decisions of 
courts are not simply declaratory of the law, but rather, on some micro-
level at the very least,11 constitutive of it.12 They are thus means by 
 
 7. The task of fact-finding thus will not be treated separately. Domestic courts are 
undoubtedly better equipped to be fact-finders than international courts, if for no other reason 
than at least due to their power to compel production of evidence. See Yuval Shany, Toward a 
General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L.  907, 919 
(2005) [hereinafter Shany, General Margin]. 
 8. Cf. The International Judicial Function:  Discussion, in THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:  AN ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM 1, 4 (James Crawford & 
Margaret Young eds., 2008), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/25_anniversary/ 
Judicial_Function_discussion.pdf (comments of Yuval Shany). 
 9. For a brief consideration of the conflicting assumptions as to the “lawmaking” power of 
the ICJ and a way to reconcile them, see Christian J. Tams & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, 
Barcelona Traction at 40:  The ICJ as an Agent of Legal Development, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
781, 782–86 (2010) [hereinafter Tams & Tzanakopoulos, Barcelona Traction]. The position of 
other international courts could be seen as analogous, at least in their respective “field” of 
international law or “sectoral regime.” 
 10. For an explicit recognition of this, see Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 17.6(ii), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Anti-Dumping Agreement].  
 11. For an expression of this, see Christopher G. Weeramantry, The Function of the 
International Court of Justice in the Development of International Law, 10 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
309, 320 (1997). 
 12. HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 242 et seq. (2d ed. 1960); cf. Iain G.M. Scobbie, 
The Theorist as Judge:  Hersch Lauterpacht’s Concept of the International Judicial Function, 8 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 264, 273–74 (1997); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 100 (1933); see also Hersch Lauterpacht, Decisions of Municipal 
Courts as a Source of International Law, 1929 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 65, 85 (1929) [hereinafter 
Lauterpacht, Municipal Courts].  
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which the law is developed,13 and courts serve as the “agents” of that 
development.14 
That these two aspects are inseparable, and constitute the “core 
meaning” of the international judicial function is supported by the 
authority of two former Presidents of the ICJ, among other 
commentators.15 Yet this authority does not refer to the international 
judicial function specifically, but rather to the judicial function in 
general. Indeed, is it not also the function of domestic courts to resolve 
disputes and thus to enforce the law within their jurisdiction, which will 
invariably serve to both clarify and develop the relevant law? 
The two fundamental and inseparable aspects of the international 
judicial function (for brevity, dispute resolution and law-development) 
are then nothing but fundamental aspects of any judicial function (i.e., 
also of the domestic judicial function).16 Indeed, “the essential features 
of the judicial settlement of disputes,” whether by domestic or by 
international courts, “seem to be universally recognized,”17 and hand-in-
hand with judicial settlement goes the development of the law.  
This brings up the question of what—if anything—separates the 
international from the domestic judicial function. A very simple answer 
would be to distinguish between courts established by international 
 
 13. Manfred Lachs, Some Reflections on the Contribution of the International Court of 
Justice to the Development of International Law, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 239, 241 
(1983).  
 14. Tams & Tzanakopoulos, Barcelona Traction, supra note 9, at 785. See also THIRD 
ILDC COLLOQUIUM ON DOMESTIC COURTS AS AGENTS OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/third-ildc-colloquium-on-domestic-courts-as-agents-of-legal-
development/ (articles on file with author, forthcoming 2012) (program available). 
 15. See Robert Y. Jennings, The Role of the International Court of Justice, 1997 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 1, 41 (stating that the primary task of a court of justice is to dispose, in accordance with 
the law, of the particular dispute between the particular parties before it, as well as the 
development of the law, if only integral and incidental to the disposal of the issues before the 
court). See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
583, 591–92 (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins) (expressing an opinion similar to that 
of Jennings). 
 16. See the consideration of (domestic) “judicial functions” in interpreting Article 2(1)(a) of 
the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property in Rep. of the 
Int’l Law Comm’n, 43d Sess., Apr. 29–July 19, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (Sept. 10, 1991), 
reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991Add.1 (Part 2) 
(stating that these functions comprise adjudication of litigation, dispute settlement, determination 
of questions of law or fact, orders of provisional or enforcement measures, and other functions 
related to a proceeding); cf. Gerhard Hafner & Ulrike Kohler, The United Nations Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 35 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 12 (2004); cf. 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORTS ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON STATE 
IMMUNITY AND THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL ¶ 8 (1985). 
 17. CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS BEFORE 
DOMESTIC COURTS 6 (1981). 
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treaty (i.e., under international law), which exercise an international 
judicial function, and those established under the law of a state, which 
do not. This highly formalistic criterion for distinction would halt the 
enquiry at a very early stage. More importantly, however, it leaves 
certain issues unaddressed. There is no doubt that domestic courts apply 
international law in a variety of cases, and with increasing regularity—
why should they then not be seen as exercising an international judicial 
function? In the final analysis they are applying (international) law to 
facts, thereby settling a dispute under (international) law, and further 
contributing to the development of that law. Both fundamental aspects 
of the (international) judicial function seem fulfilled in such a case.  
Another seemingly simple answer, flowing from the previous 
paragraph, would be one that focuses on the nature of the rules that the 
relevant court applies (i.e., whether they are “international” or 
“domestic”). Consequently, domestic courts could only ever be seen as 
engaging in an international (as distinct from domestic) judicial function 
when they deal with international, rather than domestic, norms.18 This 
distinction is taken up in the following part, as it seems to furnish the 
only meaningful criterion for telling apart the international from the 
domestic judicial function.  
II.  INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC NORMS BEFORE DOMESTIC COURTS 
 The basic argument in this part is that the distinction between 
international and domestic norms has become increasingly blurred, and 
that it is complicated by two related factors:  the directionality of 
international obligations undertaken by States (Part II.A); and the 
variety in the methods of internalization or domestication of 
international norms (Part II.B).  
 
 18. In that latter case, when acting to decide claims under international law, they would be 
“doubling” as international (judicial) organs, thus undertaking an international judicial function. 
See, e.g., Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence 
of a New International Judiciary, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 73, 74–75 (2009); M. Shah Alam, 
Enforcement of International Human Rights Law by Domestic Courts:  A Theoretical and 
Practical Study, 53 NETH. INT’L. L. REV. 399, 400 (2006); Schreuer, supra note 17, at 7; 
RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER xi 
(1964). This is along the lines of Scelle’s theory of dédoublement fonctionnel. GEORGES SCELLE, 
II PRÉCIS DE DROIT DES GENS:  PRINCIPES ET SYSTÉMATIQUE 10–12 (1934); see also generally 
Yuval Shany, National Courts as International Actors:  Jurisdictional Implications (Hebrew 
Univ. Int’l Law Forum, Research Paper No. 22-08, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292056 [hereinafter Shany, Jurisdictional 
Implications] (arguing that empirical evidence shows that national courts are more readily acting 
like international courts and thus a more robust framework for coordinating domestic and 
international legal procedures and judicial decisions is needed). 
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A.  The Directionality of International Obligations 
Not only is there a proliferation of regulation taking place at the 
international level, but also a great number of norms adopted at that 
level is characterized by a distinct and peculiar “directionality.” Many 
international norms are no longer traditional, almost exclusively 
“extrovert” or “outward-looking” obligations imposed on States with 
respect to their interaction with other States on the international plane. 
Rather, most are increasingly “introvert” or “inward-looking” norms;19 
that is to say, norms that aim to regulate State conduct within the 
domestic jurisdiction (or, to put it another way, norms whose intended 
operation is through—direct or indirect—implementation within the 
domestic jurisdiction).20 Further, certain (“traditional”) norms regulating 
State-to-State conduct on the international plane may also have an 
“introvert” aspect:  they may have the effect of creating rights for 
individuals by requiring that certain conduct be taken within the 
domestic jurisdiction.21 This highlights the difficulty in clearly 
distinguishing between outward- and inward-looking norms,22 but it 
does not stop one from considering whether a particular aspect of a 
norm is outward- or inward-looking, depending on where and how it 
seeks to produce its effects (i.e., horizontally [State-to-State] or 
vertically [within the State]).  
Inward-looking norms, or inward-looking aspects of norms, may 
demand (i) that the State undertake, or refrain from, certain conduct 
within its domestic jurisdiction; (ii) that certain limits be imposed on 
previously unregulated State conduct within its jurisdiction; or (iii) that 
the State prohibit, regulate, or permit certain conduct by natural persons 
 
 19. For the terminology and similar definitions, albeit in a slightly different context, see 
Shany, General Margin, supra note 7, at 920. 
 20. See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts as the “Natural Judge” of International 
Law:  A Change in Physiognomy, in 3 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 155, 158 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2012) [hereinafter 
Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts]; Jean d’Aspremont, The Systemic Integration of International 
Law by Domestic Courts:  Domestic Judges as Architects of the Consistency of the International 
Legal Order, in THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS AND THE (DE-) 
FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141, 142 (Ole Kristian Fauchald and André 
Nollkaemper eds., 2012) [hereinafter d’Aspremont, Domestic Judges as Architects]. 
 21. For an example of such a norm, see Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(1), 
Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 and the relevant jurisprudence of the ICJ in 
LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494, ¶ 77 (June 27); Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 35–36, ¶ 40 (Mar. 31). See also d’Aspremont, 
Domestic Judges as Architects, supra note 20, at 142–43 with further references; David Sloss, 
Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts:  A Comparative Analysis, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC 
COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT—A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 6 (David Sloss ed., 2009). 
 22. Shany, General Margin, supra note 7, at 920–21. 
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and legal entities within its jurisdiction. While few traditional 
international norms could permeate the protective veil of domestic 
jurisdiction, most prominently those dealing with immunity23 and with 
the treatment of aliens, many modern international norms are of the 
inward-looking type. A number of areas of international law, such as 
international human rights law,24 international economic law,25 
international investment law,26 international criminal law,27 international 
humanitarian law,28 the international law of the sea,29 international 
 
 23. In his Report to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, Gerhard Hafner, the 
Chairman of the Working Group on the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
Their Property, discussed the possible form of the outcome of the work on the topic, and reported 
the views of delegations as to whether a convention or a model law would be preferable. 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, Rep. of the Chairman of the 
Working Group of the 6th Comm., 54th Sess., Nov. 8–9, 1999, ¶¶ 7–12, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/ 
L.12 (Nov. 12, 1999). Commenting later on the adopted Convention, he reflected that in the view 
of some delegations, a convention was preferable because only a binding instrument would allow 
the generation of uniform state practice in an area of law where the rules were to be applied by 
national courts. Hafner & Kohler, supra note 16, at 9. See also COE EXPLANATORY REPORTS ON 
STATE IMMUNITY, supra note 16, ¶ 9 (implying that the Convention aims at “a harmonisation of 
the laws of the member States of the Council of Europe”).  
 24. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS—BETWEEN IDEALISM AND 
REALISM 110–12 (Marise Cremona et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 25. See, e.g., Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 10; Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 26. See, e.g., the tension between a State’s regulatory powers and the explicit and implicit 
limitations to these powers imposed by obligations not to expropriate or to accord “fair and 
equitable treatment” customarily found in Bilateral Investment Treaties and in multilateral treaties 
like the North American Free Trade Agreement arts. 1105 and 1110, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993) and the Energy Charter Treaty arts. 10(1) and 13, Dec. 17, 1994, 
2080 U.N.T.S. 95.  
 27. International criminal law, especially as found in specific treaties, establishes obligations 
on States to criminalize certain conduct within their jurisdictions and to prosecute such conduct. 
See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents arts. 2–3, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages arts. 2–3, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 
205; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings arts. 3–6, Dec. 15, 
1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism arts. 4–8, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197. 
 28. See, e.g., Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field arts. 49–54, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (“Geneva Convention I”); 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea arts. 50–52, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (“Geneva Convention II”); 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 129–31, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 (“Geneva Convention III”); Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War arts. 146–48, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (“Geneva Convention 
IV”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 85–87, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
(“Additional Protocol I”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
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environmental law,30 and the derivative (or secondary) law (droit 
dérivé) of some international organizations, primarily the UN when 
acting through the Security Council,31 are either exclusively made up of 
such inward-looking norms, or contain them to a significant degree. 
This has significant consequences for the implication of international 
norms with an inward-looking aspect in proceedings before domestic 
courts. 
 When inward-looking international norms, which in effect impose 
obligations on the State to take certain conduct or measures within its 
domestic jurisdiction, are looked at from within the State, the relevant 
obligations appear to be placed primarily on the State Executive, since it 
is the Executive who usually has both the legislative32 and the executive 
initiative. Domestic courts have a reactive role in this connection:  they 
are called upon to check that the Executive is acting in compliance with 
the law.33 This law will include international law requiring certain 
conduct within the domestic jurisdiction.34 Further, individuals and 
other entities may derive rights from the international obligations 
 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1, Jun. 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (“Additional Protocol II”). 
 29. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 94 (on State obligations 
to legislate domestically in various matters regarding ships flying its flag on the high seas) and 98 
(on the obligation to legislate regarding search and rescue on the high seas), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 396. 
 30. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic art. 9, Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67 (“OSPAR Convention”); Convention on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters art. 3(1), June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (“Aarhus Convention”); Kyoto Protocol to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change arts. 2–3, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 
U.N.T.S. 148.  
 31.  See, e.g., SC Res. 1373, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); SC Res 1988, 
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1988 (June 17, 2011); SC Res 1989, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1989 (June 17, 
2011). 
 32. For an explicit recognition of the limitation imposed by international law (in casu jus 
cogens and thus also outward-looking rules having that nature) on legislative initiative by the 
Swiss authorities and subsequently also by the Swiss Constitution, see Erika de Wet, The 
Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications for National 
and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 97, 101–05 (2004). 
 33. Lord Bingham of Cornhill, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67, 78 (2007) (“The 
historic role of the courts has . . . been to check excesses of the executive power . . .”). 
 34. For example, under U.K. law, if a public official is not bound to exercise discretion to 
make a decision in accordance with an unincorporated treaty, but it is still open to her to do so, 
U.K. courts may consider the unincorporated treaty in reviewing the decision. Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill, International Law in National Courts, in THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:  AN ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM 1, 2–3 (James Crawford & 
Margaret Young eds., 2008), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/25_anniversary/Int_ 
Law_in_National_Courts_paper.pdf; see also Lord Bingham of Cornhill, The Rule of Law, supra 
note 33, at 81–82; TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 110 et seq. (2010). 
  
2011] Domestic Courts in International Law 141 
assumed by the State. From the perspective of these individuals and 
entities, then, whether the right that has been violated by Executive 
action stems from international or domestic law is irrelevant:  they will 
challenge it on any available legal basis.35 From the perspective of 
domestic courts, in turn, entertaining the claim should be nothing 
unusual:  it is their proper role to police the actions of political branches 
for compliance with the law.36  
It is then ordinary for individuals to bring claims against the State 
before domestic courts when they perceive that their rights have been 
violated or that the Executive has acted illegally within the domestic 
jurisdiction. Given that a vast array of international obligations 
nowadays are of the inward-looking type, and given, further, that these 
obligations cover almost all aspects of contemporary life, many of them 
will fall to be considered by domestic courts. 
Even outward-looking, or traditional State-to-State, rules are not 
immune from being invoked by individuals before domestic courts in an 
attempt to restrain Executive action,37 although this will usually refer to 
action outwith the domestic jurisdiction and will be entertained by 
domestic courts only with great difficulty.38 To take a few examples, in 
U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, the attempt was to enforce 
the prohibition of the use of force (as in casu found to have been 
 
 35. It is instructive, for example, that individuals targeted by the regime imposed by the 
Security Council under S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) and subsequent 
relevant resolutions have challenged their designation under both domestic and international law, 
many a time in one and the same complaint. See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Court 
Reactions to UN Security Council Sanctions, in CHALLENGING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS (August Reinisch ed., 2010) 54, 54–58 [hereinafter 
Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Court Reactions] with further references to case-law. 
 36. But see R (on the application of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v. Prime Minister, 
[2002] EWHC (Admin) 2777, ¶ 36 (Eng.) (“[T]he domestic courts are the surety for the lawful 
exercise of public power only with regard to domestic law; they are not charged with policing the 
United Kingdom’s conduct on the international plane. That is for the International Court of 
Justice.”) (emphasis added) (note that the reference is to conduct on the international plane and 
not under international law). See, however, supra note 34, as well as R v. Sec’y of State for 
Home Dep’t ex parte Launder, [1997] UKHL 20; and R v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions ex parte 
Kebeline, [1999] UKHL 43. 
 37. See, e.g., Charles C. Hyde, The Supreme Court of the United States as an Expositor of 
International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (1937) (as early as 1937, Hyde was commenting that 
a domestic court may “test the propriety of acts, embracing those of its own sovereign, by what it 
conceives to be the requirements of international law”).  
 38. This is not necessarily the “fault” of the domestic court. “Political or legislative 
departments may by appropriate acts legally and effectively frustrate the effort to obtain from a 
local tribunal its own views on the question whether the requirements of international law have 
been disregarded by the sovereign.” Id. (emphasis added). On these, and on “avoidance 
techniques” invented by domestic courts themselves, see infra note 55.  
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violated by the ICJ in Nicaragua) to constrain the actions of the U.S. 
government.39 Even if the action failed in that instance, the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals noted that “[s]uch basic norms of 
international law (i.e., jus cogens norms) . . . may well have the 
domestic legal effect that appellants suggest. That is they may well 
restrain our government in the same way that the Constitution restrains 
it.”40 In R v. Jones (Margaret), the House of Lords had to consider 
whether waging an aggressive war, prohibited by international law, 
constituted a crime under English law and thus justified prima facie 
criminal reaction on the part of citizens (trying to avert the commission 
of the crime).41 In a similar case before the German courts, an army 
officer refused to provide intelligence services in connection with the 
2003 Iraq war because the war was allegedly in violation of 
international law and had his sanction set aside by the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court).42 
It appears then that domestic courts will naturally come to deal 
with many disputes involving international law in view of the inward-
looking nature of many contemporary international norms. They will 
not, however, necessarily explicitly acknowledge they are doing so, for 
in a great many instances (and in a great many domestic legal systems) 
the international norm will merely remain in the background. This is 
due to the variety of methods of “internalization” of international norms 
in different domestic legal systems, to which the next sub-part turns.   
B.  Variety in the Methods of Internalization of International Norms 
There is great divergence and variety in the methods by which 
domestic legal systems internalize rules of international law, whether 
from treaty or custom, if they explicitly internalize them at all. Yet, 
even when not explicitly internalized, international norms may still have 
an impact on the domestic legal system. 
In some domestic legal systems certain international rules are 
immediately incorporated (e.g., customary norms en bloc in some 
States; international human rights norms in other States; norms in 
 
 39. Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 934–35 
(D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 40. Id. at 941 (emphasis added).  
 41. R v. Jones (Margaret), [2006] UKHL 16. 
 42. See International Law in National Courts:  Discussion, in THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:  AN ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM 1, 3 (James Crawford & 
Margaret Young eds., 2008), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/25th_anniversary/book.php 
(comments of Professor Christian Tomuschat). 
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ratified international treaties in yet other States; any conceivable 
mixture of those; and so forth) (incorporation); others may need to be 
transformed or transposed through a domestic implementing act 
(transformation). Beyond these methods of explicit internalization or 
“domestication” of international law, there are more subtle ways in 
which international norms operate in the domestic legal order. Even 
when not incorporated or transposed, international norms may operate 
domestically through the application of a presumption of conformity of 
domestic law with international obligations incumbent on the State, 
which then requires that domestic law be construed consistently with 
international law if at all possible (consistent interpretation). Taking 
this further still, even pre-existing domestic law may happen to 
coincide, in substance, with international norms, and thus result in the 
application of international law domestically in a more or less 
“unconscious” manner (referred to in this article as “deeply 
internationalized” or “consubstantial” norms; originally a theological 
term, “consubstantiality” denotes that which is “regarded as identical in 
substance or essence” with something else, “though different in 
aspect”).43  
Examples of such “deeply internationalized,” or 
“consubstantial”—if still domestic—rules could be constitutional rights 
that in substance reflect internationally protected rights,44 or more 
generally domestic rules that are in substance reflective of an existing 
international rule, such as the rules of interpretation.45 Rules of 
international law do not lose their original character and become rules 
of domestic law by the mere fact of their domestication, or by the 
parallel existence of a substantively identical, or even merely 
significantly similar, domestic rule.46 
 
 43. CORMAC MCKEOWN & ANDREW HOLMES, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY 367 (15th 
ed. 2009). The Greek word is οµοούσιο (i.e., literally “that which has the same substance”). 
 44.  Making a similar argument, if from the inverse, David Berry has contended that when 
the Constitution can be interpreted to accord with an (unincorporated) international treaty, it can 
be seen as a transforming document (i.e., as transforming the treaty into domestic law). 
International Law in National Courts:  Discussion, supra note 42, at 4 (comments of David 
Berry). Similarly Armand De Mestral has argued that there are “many ways to incorporate 
international treaty obligations beyond the explicit statement of obligations in statutory form.” Id. 
at 4–5 (comments of Professor Armand De Mestral). From the perspective of international law 
then, applying a constitutional norm that has the same content as an international norm can be 
seen as application of international law.  
 45. Lord Bingham notes, in this connection, that there is “very little difference between the 
approach of domestic courts to interpretation and that laid down in the [1969] Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.” International Law in National Courts, supra note 34, at 3. 
 46. Lauterpacht, Municipal Courts, supra note 12, at 77. Cf. id. at 92 (“For one who chooses 
to confine himself to the field of municipal law, judges administer in all these cases the law of 
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C.  Substance over Form 
Because of the great divergence in domestic legal systems as to the 
reception of international law, and because of the various ways in which 
international norms, particularly of the inward-looking type, operate 
within these domestic legal systems, a clear distinction between 
international and domestic norms is not possible in a great number of 
cases. When a domestic court for example applies domestic law giving 
effect to an international obligation,47 or when it applies domestic law 
that in substance reflects an international norm, or when it uses 
international law to interpret domestic law in conformity with the 
former, what kind of law is the domestic court really applying? While 
formally it may be a domestic norm, in substance it will be an 
international one. 
It is then not possible to decide whether a domestic court is 
exercising an international or a domestic judicial function based simply 
on the character or nature of the norms applied as “national” or 
“international.” One would have to look more closely at the two basic 
aspects of the judicial function exercised by domestic courts, and see to 
what extent these refer to international law and international disputes. 
Yet, it would be useful to note, even at this relatively early stage of the 
inquiry, that from the perspective of international law, it does not really 
matter what law the domestic court purports to be applying. What 
matters is whether international law is complied with.48 This will be of 
crucial importance in the subsequent discussion. 
 
their own country, and nothing else. But one who looks at the substance of things rather than at 
their form must realize that when acting in that capacity municipal judges are the organs of the 
international legal community.”) (emphasis added).  
 47. For an example of this, see Jennings, International Obligations, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
 48. An explicit example of this approach is furnished by the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) system. Under Article 1 of the ECHR, the parties must “secure” 
Convention rights to persons under their jurisdiction; yet this requires neither incorporation, nor 
transformation, nor for that matter mere reference to the Convention. All that is required is that 
domestic law and practice do not result in violation of Convention rights (i.e., it is the substantive 
outcome that matters). See, e.g., Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden, App. No. 5614/72, 
¶ 50 (1976); James and others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8793/79 ¶ 84 (1986); Observer and 
Guardian v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13585/88, ¶ 76 (1991). By way of corroboration and 
extension of this point, consider the following statement: 
Whether in the human rights field or otherwise, the United Kingdom does not lightly 
become a party to a treaty . . . it will . . . want to be satisfied that its domestic law and 
its international obligations are in harmony. Sometimes it will be necessary to amend 
legislation to that end. 
Rosalyn Higgins, The Role of Domestic Courts in the Enforcement of International Human 
Rights:  The United Kingdom, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC 
COURTS 37, 37 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997) (emphasis added). 
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III.  DOMESTIC COURTS AS INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLERS AND LAW 
ENFORCERS 
A.  Dispute Settlement as Law Enforcement  
 If a judgment can be seen as settling a dispute, it is open to the 
challenge that it does not actually enforce the law. It may declare the 
law on a given matter, but that law still remains to be enforced. This 
notion of enforcement of law is inspired by the domestic law fascination 
with enforcement through coercive measures imposed by some 
centralized authority. In this sense, enforcement in international law—
unlike dispute settlement—has only exceptionally been 
institutionalized.49 Instead, the international legal system has always 
relied on domestic courts as agencies of enforcement.50 But it is not with 
this stricto sensu enforcement that one is concerned here. Rather, the 
focus is on the lato sensu enforcement of law that the handing down of 
any judicial decision constitutes, even if said decision is merely 
declaratory in character.  
 
 49. The Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter could be mentioned as 
one of the few relevant examples of institutionalization of enforcement in international law, but 
even in this instance it could be argued that the Council was established to keep the peace rather 
than enforce the law (paraphrasing Judge Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinion in Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 
16, 294, ¶ 115 (June 21)); cf. Karel Wellens, The UN Security Council and New Threats to the 
Peace:  Back to the Future, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 15, 48–50 (2003). For the argument 
that keeping the peace in the case of the Council is the same as enforcing the law, in the sense that 
a threat to the peace constitutes a breach of an international obligation, see ANTONIOS 
TZANAKOPOULOS, DISOBEYING THE SECURITY COUNCIL—COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST 
WRONGFUL SANCTIONS 78–79 (2011) [hereinafter TZANAKOPOULOS, DISOBEYING THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL]. 
 50. An obvious example, in the strict sense of enforcing an international decision, is the 
recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards in the area of international 
commercial and investment arbitration. See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, and 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States art. 54, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
There have also been attempts to enforce ICJ judgments through domestic court decisions, which 
were found to be justiciable in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Reagan, 859 F.2d. at 934–35 (holding the 
attempt at enforcement to be justiciable, even if it ultimately came to nothing for having failed to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted). Another example of the problems that attempts 
to enforce international judicial decisions through national courts are faced with is furnished by 
“Socobel” v. the Greek State, Apr. 30, 1951, 18 I.L.R. 3 (1951) (the Belgian court refused 
enforcement of a Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) decision between Belgium and 
Greece, inter alia, for lack of an exequatur of the decision in Belgium (i.e., it treated the PCIJ 
decision as a foreign award). For comment, see E.K. NANTWI, THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND ARBITRAL AWARDS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
143–45 (1966). 
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First of all, many a time a declaratory judgment is all the 
“enforcement” that States seek in international law. Gray notes the new 
importance that declaratory judgments have taken in the practice of the 
ICJ, when compared for example with that of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), and highlights that States seem satisfied 
with a declaratory judgment when they could have sought an award of 
compensation.51 Similarly, a domestic decision bearing on the 
interpretation or application of an international norm, even if simply 
declaratory, can be seen as a form of enforcement of international law.  
Much more importantly, however, there are decisions of domestic 
courts, whether declaratory or constitutive, that—in settling a dispute 
(e.g., between the Executive and an individual)—can be seen as stricto 
sensu enforcing international law. The example would be when a 
domestic court strikes down or disapplies legislation, or executive acts, 
or even decisions of lower courts that are in violation of international 
law. In such a case, the court is resolving a dispute between the parties 
before it (in part at least as to the meaning of an international norm) and 
in that it enforces the international norm, thereby avoiding the breach 
and the concomitant engagement of the international responsibility of 
the State. More pertinently still, a domestic court can address a violation 
of international law by the State of which it is an organ ex post facto, 
thereby offering “juridical restitution” (i.e., the reversal of a juridical act 
in breach of international law).52 In extreme cases, domestic courts 
could even be considered as applying countermeasures against another 
State—the enforcement mechanism par excellence of international 
law.53 
 
 51. See CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98–100 (1990). 
 52. See Commentary on the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts in Report of the International Law Commission to the 
General Assembly. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., 63–67, Apr. 23–June 1, July 10–
Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 
2(II) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, 97, ¶ 5 U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 
ASR and Commentary].  
 53. For the argument, see TZANAKOPOULOS, DISOBEYING THE SECURITY COUNCIL, supra 
note 49, at 126–28, 194–97. Note that in the oral pleadings in Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State (Ger. v. It.:  Greece intervening), Verbatim Record, ¶ 14, (Sept. 12, 2011, 10 a.m.), 
Christian Tomuschat, pleading for Germany, rejects the argument that Italian court decisions 
denying Germany’s sovereign immunity can be qualified as countermeasures, but not in 
principle; rather he rejects the argument solely because the substantive and procedural 
requirements for resorting to countermeasures are not met in casu: 
[I]t would be outright absurd to argue that the jurisdiction of the Italian courts may be 
justified as a countermeasure responding to Germany’s failure to fulfill its duty of rep-
aration. There is no such failure, and for more than 40 years, from the conclusion of the 
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With this in mind, it becomes clear that all inward-looking 
international norms depend on domestic organs, and in the last instance 
domestic courts, for their enforcement.54 A prime example here are 
international human rights norms, but also norms of international 
criminal law, the international law of the sea (e.g., with respect to 
prompt release of vessels), international investment law, as well as all 
other areas of international law where inward-looking norms are 
preponderant (see Part II.A above). Further, an argument could be made 
that domestic courts are in fact enforcing international norms even when 
they do not (explicitly) refer to international law. This would be the case 
when they apply a domestic norm adopted to give effect to an 
international obligation; when they interpret a domestic norm in 
harmony with an international obligation; or even when they enforce a 
“deeply internationalized” (or “consubstantial”) domestic rule (i.e., a 
domestic rule that has a parallel existence in international law) (see Part 
II.B above).   
B.  Settlement v. Creation of Disputes—Enforcement v. Violation of the 
Law 
 It should be mentioned at the outset that domestic courts have a 
seemingly very limited role—if they have one at all—in the settlement 
of traditional State-to-State disputes. First of all, domestic courts 
themselves have devised a number of “avoidance techniques” so as not 
to have to adjudicate matters of “international relations,” which they 
have traditionally viewed as more properly within the ambit of the 
Executive.55 After all, the Executive is in almost all domestic legal 
systems the branch entrusted with the conduct of foreign affairs.56 Yet, 
 
two compensation treaties of 1961 until the culmination of the Ferrini case, Italy never 
made any representation to Germany in that sense. 
But see the clearly different position of Andrea Gattini, also pleading for Germany, id. ¶ 33 (“. . . 
it is not the business of domestic courts to decide and enforce countermeasures against a foreign 
State.”) Gattini does not offer any justification for this position. 
 54. Cf. Jennings, International Obligations, supra note 4, at 9 (stating that “considerable and 
important parts of international law have long been applied and enforced by domestic courts—but 
to individuals and corporations . . . not to sovereign States”).  
 55. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of 
International Law:  An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 159 (1993) 
(addressing avoidance techniques adopted by national courts when dealing with international 
norms); see generally also AUGUST REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE 
NATIONAL COURTS 391 (2000) (summarizing the discussion of the same or similar devices being 
used by courts to avoid review of acts of international organizations). 
 56. See draft article 9(3) as proposed by Special Rapporteur G.G. Fitzmaurice, First Report 
on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/101 (Mar. 14, 1956), reprinted in [1956] II Y.B. Int’l 
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if anything, even when domestic courts do engage with such disputes, it 
could be argued that their role is to create them, rather than to resolve 
them. If the domestic court of State A resolves a dispute between “its 
own” State and State B, the expectation would be that State B will 
protest, and the dispute between the two states will “mature.” Domestic 
courts being the organs of a State, their actions are attributable to that 
State, and since they may well be in breach of international obligations 
incumbent upon the State, these actions will engage the State’s 
international responsibility.57 Examples would include anything from a 
denial of sovereign immunity, to the decision not to apply a treaty 
provision for lack of reciprocity in the application of the provision by 
the other State.  
On the other hand, if one were to cast the net very widely, with an 
eye to the “directionality” of international norms mentioned in Part II 
above, one would qualify as “international” disputes all disputes before 
a domestic court that implicate an international norm.58 If this is 
“casting the net widely,” it is not really contentious. Surely prize courts 
have been seen traditionally as exercising a truly international judicial 
function in this respect, being “free judicial agencies impartially 
administering international law”59 in disputes relating to the seizure and 
condemnation of ships, including merchant ships, and their cargo, in 
accordance with the international law of armed conflict.60 If prize courts 
 
L. Comm’n 104, 109, and commentary at 118–19 (giving an example of the primary role reserved 
to the executive branch). 
 57. See ASR and Commentary art. 4, supra note 52, at 40–41, ¶ 6; LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J., at 
508, ¶¶ 114–15; Case C-224/01, Köbler v. Republik Österreich, 2003 E.C.R. I-10239; see 
generally CONSTANTIN TH. EUSTATHIADÈS, 1 LA RESPONSIBILITÉ INTERNATIONALE DE L’ÉTAT 
POUR LES ACTES DES ORGANES JUDICIAIRES (1936) (giving an early iteration of this principle).  
 58. Extrapolating from Bernhardt, supra note 4, at 24, it is arguable that an international 
dispute exists when individuals or legal entities bring a claim against their own or another State, 
when that claim is “framed” (umschrieben) by international law (e.g., when it is made under a 
human rights treaty, or other treaty granting rights to individuals and legal entities, or under 
customary international law).  
 59. Lauterpacht, Municipal Courts, supra note 12, at 65. 
 60. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED 
CONFLICTS AT SEA, ¶ 116 (1994), reprinted in SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995); DEP’T OF THE 
NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶ 7.10 (2007); 
CANADA OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE 
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS:  JOINT DOCTRINE MANUAL ¶ 870 (2001); 
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER VERTEIDIGUNG, HUMANITÄRES VÖLKERRECHT IN BEWAFFNETEN 
KONFLIKTEN:  HANDBUCH ¶¶ 1144–46 (1992). 
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are not exactly a common occurrence these days,61 they do serve to 
demonstrate that domestic courts exercise an international judicial 
function when deciding a dispute by “administering” international law. 
It is no longer the case that international law “regulates only the 
relations between States” so that “the proper and normal occasion for 
the judicial application of rules of international law is the existence of 
disputes between States.”62 The need to consider and apply international 
law should be deemed sufficient to characterize a dispute before a 
domestic court as an “international” dispute.  
As discussed in Part II.B above, however, it is rather difficult to 
determine whether an international norm is at bar. The international 
norm being “administered” by the domestic court may have been 
internalized through incorporation, transformation, adoption of relevant 
legislation in compliance with the international norm, or may not have 
been explicitly internalized at all; but it may still operate through a 
presumption for the interpretation of domestic law in harmony with 
international obligations of the State (“consistent interpretation”), or 
through pre-existing “consubstantial” domestic law. In cases where 
individuals or legal entities within the domestic jurisdiction of a State 
bring a case in domestic court against the State for violation of its 
obligations or limits to its discretion, as these have been imposed, in the 
final analysis, by international—if inward-looking (aspects of)—norms, 
the domestic court will be engaged in the settlement of a dispute under 
international law (i.e., a dispute whose subject-matter is regulated by 
international law), and, in that, in the settlement of an international 
dispute, even if it claims to be applying only domestic law. This is 
either because the source of the domestic norm will be in international 
law, or because the two will be “consubstantial.”  
However, even in such a situation it may still very well be that the 
domestic court is in fact creating, rather than settling, the international 
dispute (or it is allowing it to “mature”); it is violating rather than 
enforcing international law. This would be the case if the domestic court 
misinterprets, misapplies, or disregards the international norm. The 
court would thereby engage the State’s international responsibility, and 
invite claims against it by other States, or, as the case may be, by other 
beneficiaries of the international norm that are given standing under 
international law to bring a claim in the particular instance (e.g., 
 
 61. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 366 
Mn. 13.89 (2004) (noting at footnote 103 that the U.K. “has not used prize courts for many years 
and is unlikely to do so in the future”).  
 62. Lauterpacht, Municipal Courts, supra note 12, at 73.  
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individuals protected under international human rights law, or investors 
protected under international investment law). It would appear then that 
the role of domestic courts as settlers of international disputes and 
enforcers of international law is limited only to when it can be argued 
that they applied international law correctly:  only then will an 
international dispute have been settled and international law enforced. 
But who decides whether international law was correctly applied by the 
domestic court? Who decides if the domestic court has enforced, rather 
than violated, international law?  
C.  Who Decides? Domestic Courts as the “Natural” Judges of 
International Law 
In the decentralized international legal system, there is no final 
arbiter of legality other than States themselves. As the addressees of 
international norms, States interpret and apply them in the first 
instance,63 thereby being the prima facie arbiters of legality of their 
own—and anyone else’s—conduct.64 If this power of auto-interpretation 
and application of international law sounds ominous, that is probably 
because it is rather ominous. But States always interpret and apply 
international law at their own risk:65 it is possible that their 
interpretation and application will be challenged, and will be found 
lacking before an international court, or in the context of some other 
procedure for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. In 
international law then, authoritative interpretation and the final 
 
 63. See Georges Abi-Saab, “Interprétation” et “Auto-Interprétation”—Quelques réflexions 
sur leur rôle dans la formation et la résolution du différend international, in RECHT ZWISCHEN 
UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG—FESTSCHRIFT FÜR RUDOLF BERNHARDT 9, 14–15 (Ulrich 
Beyerlin ed., 1995); see generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 
(2003) (providing that “norms of international law are seldom ‘finished products’, simply 
requiring implementation”). 
 64. See Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 Between the United States of America 
and France (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, 443, ¶ 81 (1978) (providing that “each State establishes 
for itself its legal situation vis-à-vis other States”); Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 12 
R.I.A.A. 281, 310, ¶ 16 (1957) (providing that “il appartient à chaque État d’apprécier, 
raisonnablement et de bonne foi, les situations et les règles qui le mettent en cause”); United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 28, ¶ 53 (May 24); 
Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 26 (May 28) [hereinafter Reservations to the Genocide Convention]; 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, 134, ¶ 268 (June 27) . See also KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE, supra note 12, at 324. 
 65. Cf. James Crawford, Countermeasures as Interim Measures, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 65, 66 
(1994); ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 459, 471 
(2006). 
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settlement of a dispute can only come from a centrally instituted third-
party instance,66 or through agreement between the States-parties to the 
rule or the dispute.67 All exercises of the power of auto-interpretation by 
States unilaterally are then subject to this proviso:  that they are not 
authoritative or final, but they are at the acting State’s own risk. 
For lack of a third-party instance or an agreement, however, the 
first instance exercise of the power of auto-interpretation also becomes, 
de facto, the last. This means that States, and courts as their organs, are 
the natural judges of international law (i.e., the immediate judges, the 
ones who will interpret and apply international law when no centrally 
instituted judge exists).68 And while the auto-interpretation and 
application of the law by the Executive is usually merely implicit in the 
actions that it takes, domestic courts are the ones who will be called 
upon to consider the conformity of State conduct with international law, 
precisely because of the abundance of inward-looking rules. The nature 
of these rules necessitates that in the last instance, looked at from within 
the State, executive or legislative action will be challenged before the 
domestic court, often by reference to an international inward-looking 
rule, even if that rule has been (explicitly or implicitly) domesticated—
as described in Part II above.  
 
 66. It is for this reason, not merely because of the lack of a centralized legislator, that judges 
in international law play allegedly “a far more important role” than at the domestic level. Cf. The 
International Judicial Function:  Discussion, supra note 8, at 4 (comments by Professor Alain 
Pellet). Cf. also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT 159 (1958). See J. L. Brierly, Sanctions, 17 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS 
SOC’Y 67, 70–71 (1932). See also Peter Malanczuk, Zur Repressalie im Entwurf der International 
Law Commission zur Staatenverantwortlichkeit, 45 ZAÖRV 293, 296 (1985). Cf. Appellate Body 
Report, Canada—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC—Hormones Dispute, ¶ 371, 
WT/DS321/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008). In the law of treaties, it has been noted that the only alternative 
to an agreement of the parties (as to the existence of the invalidity of a treaty or to the bringing 
about its termination or suspension) is the “sentence d’un juge international.” Francesco Capotori, 
L’extinction et la suspension des traités, 134 RECUEIL DES COURS 417, 564 (1971). Cf. Antonios 
Tzanakopoulos, Article 67 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, in THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON 
THE LAW OF TREATIES 1546, 1551–55, ¶¶ 11–21, in particular at 1554–55, ¶¶ 17, 20 (Olivier 
Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011). 
 67. This is in line with the “established principle” enunciated by the PCIJ that a rule can 
only be authoritatively interpreted by the one who can amend or repeal it. Question of Jaworzina 
(Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier), Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 8, at 37 (Dec. 6). 
See also HANS KELSEN, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 174–75 (1925). 
 68. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Draught of a Code for the Organization of the Judicial 
Establishment in France, in 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 296–97 (1843) (commenting 
on Title V, § 1, arts. I–III). The term “natural judge” seems to have been employed in this sense 
by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in Librairie Hachette v. Société Coopérative, 72 INT. L. REP. 78, 
80–81 (1987). See also Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts, supra note 20, at 156–57.  
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As organs of the State, courts have a mandate to interpret and 
apply these international rules. That mandate is granted to them by 
virtue of international law, quite apart from potential domestic 
constitutional provisions to similar or even converse effect. Admittedly, 
international law imposes international obligations on the unitary State, 
of which courts are merely organs. But international law assigns to 
domestic courts a position more important to that of the Executive or 
the Legislature in the implementation of the State’s international 
obligations. It establishes them as the “natural judges” of international 
law, at one and the same time the point of first contact and the last line 
of defense, the last opportunity for the State to comply with its 
international obligations. 
A number of arguments can be invoked to support the assertion 
that international law establishes domestic courts as the natural judges 
of international law. An “important principle of customary law”69 
requires the exhaustion of local remedies before a claim that an (inward-
looking)70 international norm has been violated is made admissible on 
the international plane.71 In this rule, international law acknowledges the 
international judicial function of domestic courts as dispute-settlers and 
law-enforcers, and reserves a mere subsidiary monitoring function for 
the international instance. The domestic court is given the opportunity 
to successfully deal with the essence of the international claim,72 by 
correctly applying (but only in substance, not necessarily explicitly) 
international law.73  
The subsidiary role of international courts in comparison to the 
primary role reserved for their domestic counterparts is made explicit in 
international criminal law, namely in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.74 Further, the important role of domestic 
 
 69. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. [ELSI] (U.S. v. It.), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 42, ¶ 50 (July 20).  
 70. The relationship between inward-looking rules and the local remedies rule is evident in 
that the rule does not apply in cases where the breach took place outside the jurisdiction of the 
state. Cf. Nsongurua J. Udombana, So Far, So Fair:  The Local Remedies Rule in the 
Jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 
5–6 (2003) with further references. 
 71. See further commentary to art. 44(b) ASR and Commentary, supra note 52, at 121, ¶ 3 
(noting that the local remedies rule applies to claims that are not necessarily limited to the field of 
diplomatic protection).  
 72. Cf. ELSI, supra note 69, at 46, ¶ 59; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, supra note 
21, at 35–36, ¶ 40. 
 73. Cf. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1957 I.C.J. 9, 40–41 (July 6) 
(separate opinion of Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht). 
 74. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90.  
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courts in the enforcement of international criminal law is highlighted in 
the international obligations to extradite or prosecute offenders included 
in various treaties, and possibly existing under general international 
law.75 In this latter case the domestic court is in fact the only judicial 
body that will administer international law with respect to the 
international crime.  
In the field of human rights, as well as in many other fields of 
international law, the gradual acceptance of a margin of appreciation in 
favor of domestic authorities, including domestic courts, points in the 
same direction of subsidiarity between national and international 
courts.76 In international economic law there is even explicit reference to 
a similar concept:  Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
provides, for example, that “[w]here the panel finds that a relevant 
provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible 
interpretation, the panel shall find the [domestic] authorities’ measure 
to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those 
permissible interpretations.”77 Even in the field of international 
investment law the international judicial function of the domestic court 
is retained unless explicitly contracted out of in favor of an international 
instance.78 Then again, in many agreements it is potentially retained 
through “fork in the road” provisions.   
Finally, even State Executives have themselves used their State’s 
domestic courts as the final opportunity to comply with international 
obligations.79  
But the question remains:  who decides authoritatively, with 
binding force, whether the domestic court has—in any given case—
lived up to the expectation of being the “natural judge” of international 
law? Who decides whether in the instance the domestic court settled the 
dispute/enforced the law or rather created a dispute by not enforcing the 
law? The answer would have to be:  States themselves do, either in the 
 
 75. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT 
JUDICARE:  THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995); Zdzislaw 
Galicki, Preliminary Report on the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (“aut dedere aut 
judicare”), Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/571 (June 7, 2006). The International Law Commission’s (ILC) work on the topic is 
still ongoing.  
 76. See Shany, General Margin, supra note 7, at 926–31. 
 77. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 10, art. 17.6(ii) (emphasis added). 
 78. See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 50, art. 25(1). 
 79. See, e.g., Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2004) (the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledging the legal interest of the State to intervene in 
judicial proceedings between private parties, and even appeal the decision of a lower court, where 
that decision would result in a breach of U.S. international obligations). 
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traditional decentralized manner (lack of protest/acquiescence)80 or 
through the introduction of a third-party instance at the international 
level to “supervise” the domestic court. 
This, in turn, points to domestic courts being integrated in the 
system of international dispute settlement. Domestic courts are 
instituted as the last instance within the State that can uphold 
international law and in that way avoid its violation by the State and the 
concomitant engagement of the State’s international responsibility. 
Domestic courts, however, are also subject to the supervision of States 
as the “lawmaking” organ of international law, which in the instance 
perform a “corrective function” akin to that performed by the 
Legislature in response to court decisions in some domestic legal orders, 
and of the international courts that these States institute. What remains 
to be seen is whether the consideration of domestic courts as law-
interpreters and -developers yields the same answers to the same 
questions.  
IV.  DOMESTIC COURTS AS INTERNATIONAL LAW-INTERPRETERS  
AND -DEVELOPERS 
 If international law assigns domestic courts an international 
judicial function in the settlement of disputes and law enforcement, 
what does this mean for the courts’ potential role in developing 
international law? It has already been argued that the settlement of 
disputes and the concomitant enforcement of the law in any particular 
instance cannot be separated from the interpretation and further 
development of the law, which are both points on a spectrum.81 To the 
extent that domestic courts undertake an international judicial function 
in settling lato sensu international disputes and thus enforcing 
international law, they will also help to develop international law. 
Justice Cardozo embraced the international law-development function 
of domestic courts when he stated that international law “has at times, 
like the common law within States, a twilight existence . . . till at length 
the imprimatur of a [domestic] court attests its jural quality.”82 
Attesting the “jural quality” of a rule in heretofore “twilight existence” 
is not all that different from constituting the rule, thereby developing 
existing law.  
 
 80. See, e.g., Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 1, 39 (1974–75). 
 81. See text at supra, note 5. 
 82. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934) (emphasis added). 
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A.  Domestic Courts as State Organs 
It is a trite observation that domestic courts, as State organs, 
produce State practice and utter opinio juris, and are therefore capable 
of creating or contributing to the creation of customary norms.83 
Domestic courts are at the same time law-appliers and law-creators, and 
officially so. And if one reminds us that from the perspective of 
international law domestic court decisions are merely facts,84 we can 
quickly retort that in international law ex factis jus oritur. Because of 
the decentralized method of production of international law, whole 
areas of it have been almost exclusively developed through the 
jurisprudence of domestic courts. The laws of jurisdiction and of 
immunity from jurisdiction can be invoked as convenient cases in 
point.85 Both the International Law Commission86 and the ICJ87 have 
recognized the potential of domestic courts for further developing the 
law of immunity through their practice. But the crucial question—as 
with any instance of State conduct capable of contributing towards law-
creation—is how to determine whether domestic court practice violates 
international law rather than correctly interpreting it and thus 
contributing to its development.  
B.  Consistent Interpretation  
Before we proceed to discuss the distinction between violation and 
development of international law on the part of domestic courts, it is 
necessary to devote some brief comments to the courts’ interpretative 
function. Domestic courts necessarily engage in interpreting 
international law directly when they are faced with applying an 
international norm. This will be the case, for example, when a state’s 
domestic law incorporates international law through a constitutional 
 
 83. See Lauterpacht, Municipal Courts, supra note 12, at 80 et se q. 
 84. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 19 
(May 25). 
 85. See Jennings, International Obligations, supra note 4, at 12. 
 86. See, for example, Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property:  Information 
and Materials Submitted by Governments, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 33rd Sess., May 4–
July 24, 1981, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/343, at 17, ¶ 1 (Apr. 14, 1981), where the UN Legal Counsel, 
pursuant to the request of the ILC, which had just taken up the subject of jurisdictional 
immunities of States, requests UN Member States to submit relevant material “including . . . 
decisions of national tribunals.” For the importance given to domestic court decisions, and 
judicial practice generally in this context, a cursory look at the questions addressed to Member 
States in the document cited would suffice. 
 87. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 
24, ¶ 58 (Feb. 14, 2002). 
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provision or as common law.88 But domestic courts will also interpret 
and apply international law when they engage in the interpretation and 
application of a domestic implementing act. Many rules of international 
law, particularly inward-looking norms, require the State to take action 
to implement them in the domestic jurisdiction.89 In claims before 
domestic courts, it will be the immediate or proximate source of 
regulation that is usually invoked (domestic implementing act), rather 
than the more remote one (international norm).   
In those latter cases, and especially when the international norm 
does not leave any margin of appreciation, or any room for discretion, 
to the domestic implementing authorities, interpretation of the 
proximate (domestic) act will at one and the same time constitute an 
interpretation of the more remote one (the international norm). Courts 
may take cognizance of that and even have recourse to the international 
norm in order to decide on the interpretation or application (or even 
validity) of the domestic act.90 Yet they may also ignore the existence of 
the international norm and proceed with the interpretation only of the 
domestic act invoked. Further, even if they do acknowledge the 
international norm as the source of the domestic regulation, they may 
 
 88. Examples include the United States, where treaties of the U.S. are treated as “law of the 
land,” see U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; and the United Kingdom, where international customary law 
is considered as law of the land (though the situation is much more complicated than this 
statement might suggest), see International Law in National Courts:  Discussion, supra note 42, 
at 5 (comments of Roger O’Keefe). Many continental European States, such as Germany, 
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [Basic Law], 
May 23, 1949, BGBl. 25, and Greece, 2008 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 28(1), also 
incorporate rules of international law, whether customary or stemming from treaties to which they 
have become parties, respectively. 
 89. To take but one example, the implementation of binding Security Council Resolutions 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter requires in most States the adoption of domestic 
implementing acts, whether legislation or executive/administrative action. See generally Vera 
Gowlland-Debbas, Implementing Sanctions Resolutions in Domestic Law, in NATIONAL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY 33 (Vera 
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004). 
 90. See, e.g., the case of the Al-Haramain Foundation before Dutch courts, reported in U.N. 
Chairman of the S.C. Comm., Letter dated Mar. 8, 2006 from the Chairman of the Security 
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/154, at 46, ¶¶ 8–9 (Mar. 10, 2006); cf. R (on the application of M) v. 
HM’s Treasury, [2008] UKHL 26; and Case C-340/08, The Queen, M and Others v. Her 
Majesty’s Treasury, 2010 E.C.R. I-3913. These cases refer to the interpretation of domestic 
implementing acts and legislation with respect to the sanctions regime established by the Security 
Council under Resolutions 1267 (1999) et seq. The relevant courts have direct recourse to the 
international norm in order to interpret the domestic act.  
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proceed to interpret both of them in a questionable manner,91 risking 
breach of the international obligations of the State. On the other hand, 
such questionable interpretation may impact the interpretation of the 
international norm by other courts or by its creators, or even lead the 
creators of the international norm to amend it.92 
Finally, and most importantly, interpretation (and thus clarification 
and development) of international law may take place in cases where 
the domestic court applies exclusively domestic law but finds that it 
must interpret it in such a way so as not to conflict with international 
obligations incumbent upon the State. In such cases, interpretation of 
the international norm and its requirements is necessary, as it is this 
interpretation that will inform the interpretation of the (potentially 
unrelated) domestic norms. This principle of “consistent interpretation” 
is to be found in the law or judicial practice of many States, and 
highlights how the relevant domestic courts exercise an international 
judicial function even when not at all engaged in the direct application 
of international law.93   
 
 91. For example in Bosphorus Hava v. Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications, 
and the Attorney General, [1994] ILRM 551, 557–58, the Irish High Court acknowledged the 
connection between a domestic regulation and a Security Council Resolution but proceeded to 
interpret both norms contrary to the interpretation that had been offered by the Security Council, 
the creator of the international norm in the instance. See also Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Court 
Reactions, supra note 35, for further examples.  
 92. This is, for example, what happened in R (on the application of Othman) v. Sec’y of 
State for Work and Pensions, [2001] EWHC (Admin) 1022, ¶ 57, where the judge “read into” a 
Security Council Resolution imposing sanctions some exceptions in order to safeguard a 
sanctioned individual’s right to life and health. A year later the Security Council had adopted 
similar exceptions for humanitarian reasons. See S.C. Res. 1452, ¶ 1, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. 
S/Res/1452 (Dec. 20, 2002). For a further example in an unrelated field of international law see 
Part IV.C infra. 
 93. For reasons of space, only a brief overview will be given here. The locus classicus of 
“consistent interpretation” is the U.S. Supreme Court’s “Charming Betsy” principle. See Murray 
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804); see also MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 
416, 434 (1913). In Germany, the rule of consistent interpretation is seen as flowing from the 
Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit of the Basic Law, and has been reiterated by the Federal Constitutional 
Court. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 26, 1987, 74 
BVerfGE 358, at 370; see also, e.g., Bruno Simma et al., The Role of German Courts in the 
Enforcement of International Human Rights, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
DOMESTIC COURTS 71, 94–96 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997). In 
Switzerland, the principle of consistent interpretation is called “Schubert-Praxis” and flows from 
the relevant practice of the Federal Supreme Court. See de Wet, supra note 32, at 104 & n.37. A 
principle of consistent interpretation exists in Australia, as enunciated by the High Court. See 
Kruger v. Commonwealth of Australia, 118 INT. L. REP. 371, 374, 377–79 (2001); see also The 
International Judicial Function:  Discussion, supra note 8, at 3 (comments of Melissa Perry). In 
New Zealand there exists a very strong presumption of conformity with international law. See 
Philip Sales & Joanne Clement, International Law in Domestic Courts:  The Developing 
Framework, 124 L. Q. REV. 388, 393–94 (2008) (U.K.); see also International Law in National 
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What is more, it could be said that domestic courts even interpret 
international norms when they engage in interpretation of a 
“consubstantial,” if formally unrelated, domestic norm.94 For example, 
some domestic courts consider international law as informing the 
interpretation of their Constitution.95 Even when they do not, the 
interpretation of a domestic norm that is in substance similar or identical 
to an international norm is bound to have repercussions as an instance 
of State practice. In all these cases, again, the question is how to 
distinguish between proper “interpretation” (and development) and 
violation of international law:  domestic court interpretations may not 
accord with the (alleged) position under international law. It is to this 
issue that we must now turn. 
C.  Violation or Development? 
Domestic courts undertake an international law-developing 
function even when they are ostensibly violating international law. At 
the outset it should be noted that violation of the law always has in it the 
seeds for future development, or change, of the law. Who, for example, 
 
Courts:  Discussion, supra note 44, at 5 (comments by Sir Kenneth Keith). Canada also has a 
principle of consistent interpretation both with respect to treaty obligations and obligations under 
international law. See Bouzari and others v. Islamic Republic of Iran, (2004) 71 O.R. 3d 675, 
¶¶ 64–66 (Can. Ont. C.A.). As does Canada, so does, arguably, South Africa. See Azanian 
People’s Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 671 
(CC) at 25, ¶ 26 (S. Afr.). Italian courts engage in a rather peculiar construction with results 
similar to those of adopting a principle of consistent interpretation:  they consider international 
law rules as special norms that are not superseded by later (domestic) general norms. See 
Benedetto Conforti, National Courts and the International Law of Human Rights, in ENFORCING 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 3, 11–12 (Benedetto Conforti & 
Francesco Francioni eds., 1997). The Polish Constitution provides in Article 91 that if domestic 
statutes cannot be reconciled with international treaties ratified with prior parliamentary consent, 
the international treaty shall prevail over the domestic statute. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ 
POLSKIEJ [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, art. 91 (Pol.). As for the United Kingdom, there 
is (a) a presumption of compatibility in the common law regarding unincorporated treaty 
obligations, and (b) a statutory provision in § 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires 
that U.K. legislation be interpreted in a manner compatible with ECHR rights “so far as it is 
possible to do so.” Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3 (U.K.) (I must thank Shaheed Fatima for 
clarifying this point). Finally, the European Court of Justice has adopted a principle of consistent 
interpretation of European Union (E.U.) law with international obligations of the E.U. See Case 
C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp., 1992 E.C.R. I-6019, ¶ 9; 
Case C-308/06, Interanko 2008 E.C.R. I-4057, ¶ 51. See also generally Betlem & Nollkaemper, 
supra note 6, and d’Aspremont, Domestic Judges as Architects, supra note 20, at 143–44 (on 
consistent interpretation). 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 43–44. 
 95. Examples would include the United States (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)), 
Canada (Suresh v. Canada, [2002] S.C.R. 1, ¶ 60 (Can.)), and South Africa (AZAPO, supra note 
93, ¶ 26). 
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would argue that the PCIJ did not “violate” the customary principle of 
exclusive flag State jurisdiction on the high seas in SS Lotus96 by finding 
it not to have been proven as existing custom? Or that the ICJ did not 
violate the principle of integrity of treaties in its Advisory Opinion on 
Reservations to the Genocide Convention?97 State reaction to the court 
judgments in those cases—in the former, the clear establishment of a 
rule of exclusive flag State jurisdiction;98 in the latter, acquiescence to 
the new principle of universality99—either stopped the judicial 
development of international law or brought it to fruition.  
Much more crucially, drawing a dividing line between violation 
and development is not only difficult in many instances, but also 
overwhelmingly subjective, at least to the extent that no final and 
authoritative decision-maker has been instituted or has expressed 
herself. Domestic courts partake in the law-developing capacity of any 
judicial institution, and their contribution to the development of 
international law, even through its violation, is fundamental.100 This is 
not only because international law vests in them—as State organs—the 
capacity to make new law or develop the law through their practice; it is 
also precisely because international law endows them with an 
international judicial function and establishes them as the “natural” or 
first-instance judges of international law. A number of examples will be 
invoked to corroborate this point.  
The first relates to the interpretation and application of 
international treaty law, and finds a parallel in the cases mentioned 
earlier on the interpretation of domestic acts implementing Security 
Council Resolutions.101 In a case relating to the application of the 1992 
Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 International Oil Pollution 
Compensation (IOPC) Fund Convention,102 the Greek Supreme Court103 
 
 96. 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10, at 27. 
 97. See Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 64; see also Alain Pellet, 
Article 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, in THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES:  A COMMENTARY 405, 411 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011). 
 98. See International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal 
Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision or Other Incidents of Navigation art. 1, May 10, 1952, 439 
U.N.T.S. 233; Convention on the High Seas art. 11, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 
11. 
 99. As finally evident in the provisions on reservations of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19–23, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 100. Conforti, supra note 93, at 6–7.  
 101. See supra notes 90–93.  
 102. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 
973 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Protocol of 1992, Nov. 27, 1992, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.9/15; 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
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interpreted the term “ship” in the Conventions clearly contrary to the 
interpretation of the term that was agreed by the States-parties 
constituted as the Assembly of the 1992 IOPC Fund.104 What is more, 
the Assembly had noted that its interpretations should be considered as 
subsequent agreement within the meaning of 31(3)(a) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and was thus binding, also for the 
courts of States-parties.105 Yet in light of the jurisprudence of the Greek 
Supreme Court, and in light of the new conditions that were brought to 
the forefront, inter alia, by that case-law with respect to recent changes 
in international maritime trade,106 the Assembly is reconsidering its own 
definition of “ship” in the Conventions, with a view to bringing it up-to-
date. This process was still under way in 2012, but the case exemplifies 
both the potential for international law-development of domestic courts, 
and the difficulty in clearly qualifying a domestic court decision as 
being in violation of international law.  
Another aspect in which the contribution of domestic courts can be 
seen as crucial is the elaboration of normative hierarchy in international 
law. In a number of cases before domestic (and regional international, 
which in the instance will be assimilated to domestic) courts, 
individuals targeted by the 1267 sanctions regime of the Security 
Council sought to attack the Council measures by attacking their 
domestic implementing acts on the basis of both international and 
domestic law, primarily on the basis of the internationally and 
constitutionally protected right to a fair trial.107 When domestic courts 
finally upheld their claims and struck down the domestic implementing 
measures, forcing their States to disobey the Security Council 
Resolutions, they did so by relying on domestic constitutional 
provisions safeguarding the right to a fair trial. While this has been 
criticized as dualism, a closer consideration of the relevant cases 
 
Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, amended by Protocol of 1992, Nov. 27, 
1992, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.9/16. 
 103. Marine Environmental Services M.C. and Environmental Protection Technical S.A. v. 
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1992, Final Appeal Judgment in Cassation, No. 
23/2006, 6 July 2006, ILDC 586 (GR 2006). 
 104. See Int’l Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, Record of Decisions of the Eighth Session 
of the Executive Committee, § 4.3, Doc. 92FUND/EXC.8/8, (2000). 
 105. See Int’l Oil Pollution Comp. Fund 1992 [IOPCF], Resolution No. 8 on the 
Interpretation and Application of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund 
Convention, IOPCF Doc. 92FUND/AC.1/A/ES.7/7—Annex (May 9, 2003).  
 106. See Int’l Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, Application of the 1992 Conventions to 
Ship-to-Ship Oil Transfer Operations and Floating Storage, Doc. IOPC/OCT10/4/3/1 (2010).  
 107. See Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Court Reactions, supra note 35, at 58. 
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(among them prominently Kadi,108 and the U.K. Supreme Court’s 
Ahmed109) reveals that domestic courts relied on domestic law precisely 
to avoid the overriding effect of Article 103 of the UN Charter (UNC), 
which in the instance would be to obliterate the right to a fair trial. 
While the decisions in both cases were made on domestic law grounds, 
the constitutional or fundamental right sought to be protected, namely 
that to a fair trial, is deeply internationalized, having found expression 
both in widely ratified international treaties, and in customary 
international law. In substance then, domestic courts in these cases can 
be seen as preferring one international norm over another. In fact, this 
reaction of domestic courts has been forcing the Security Council to 
reconsider the remedies available to individuals sanctioned under the 
1267 regime.110 Domestic courts could then be seen either as clarifying 
the interpretation of Article 103 UNC to the effect that it cannot 
override, for example, customary law or certain human rights, even if 
these are not considered jus cogens, or as establishing certain rights (in 
particular the right to a fair trial) as jus cogens.111  
Conversely, it can be argued that the rather consistent approach of 
domestic courts on the matter of the effects of jus cogens norms on the 
rule of immunity has served to confirm that no change or new 
understanding of normative hierarchy has taken hold as a matter of 
general international law.112 In this situation it is clear that, despite the 
occasional dissenting domestic decision (on which see the immediately 
following paragraph), State practice through domestic court decisions 
confirms that jus cogens norms do not have the effect of superseding the 
 
 108. Joint Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi, Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council of the 
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2009). 
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 112. See generally ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 65, at 552–54.  
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rule of immunity. That international courts will take this into 
consideration when faced with a similar question is evident in the ICJ’s 
discussion of domestic court decisions in Arrest Warrant.113 At the same 
time, it remains open to domestic courts to start consistently 
acknowledging an exception to immunity for violations of jus cogens, 
thereby developing the principles of normative hierarchy in 
international law.114 
Still on the issue of immunity, a further example is provided by the 
dispute between Germany and Italy with respect to sovereign 
immunity.115 The origins of the dispute lie in a series of decisions of 
Greek116 and Italian courts117 denying the sovereign immunity of 
Germany for gross violations of international humanitarian law during 
World War II. In this case, the availability of an international instance 
has led to the submission of the dispute created by the Italian domestic 
court decisions to the ICJ. There is no doubt that the ICJ decision in this 
case may have the effect of halting the development by its offering of an 
interpretation of the law contrary to that proffered by the Italian courts. 
This only demonstrates further, however, that domestic courts have a 
clear and important role in the law-development aspect of an 
international judicial function, even if only as a cog in the machinery of 
judicial development of international law. 
V.  AN INTEGRATED ARCHITECTURE 
What then is the position of domestic courts in the international 
legal order and in the international judicial function? What is it that 
holds their dispute-settlement and law-development functions together? 
With respect to both aspects, they have an important role:  settling 
disputes and enforcing international law—or creating disputes (or 
rather, allowing them to “mature”) and prompting enforcement of the 
law on the international plane; and interpreting and developing 
international law—or violating it, depending on the reaction of States on 
the international plane. The common question is who decides whether 
the domestic court is fulfilling each aspect of its international judicial 
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function or violating the law. And the answer to this question 
demonstrates how the international judicial function of domestic courts 
is integrated in the general international judicial function. Just as 
domestic courts are a cog in the machinery of judicial development, so 
are they a cog in the machinery of dispute-settlement and enforcement:  
their decisions will either resolve disputes, thus enforcing, but also 
interpreting and thus developing international law (if States acquiesce to 
their decisions, or if these are confirmed by an international supervisory 
instance—an international court); or they will instigate protest and 
reaction, thus either forcing a dispute to mature—and eventually to be 
resolved, or forcing the principal actors—States—to change (read:  
develop) the law.  
Domestic courts are thus part of an integrated architecture of the 
international judicial function, established as the “natural” or 
“immediate” judges of international law, and subjected to the 
supervision of international judicial institutions—and in the final 
analysis, States themselves. 
If international law establishes domestic courts as the “natural” 
judges of international law in an integrated architecture with 
international courts and the decentralized action of States, then perhaps 
this is cause for alarm. If we heed Lord Bingham’s warning, it is far 
preferable that disputes between States be resolved by negotiation, 
compromise, or if need be by decision of an international tribunal. 
Domestic courts may not be experienced in international law matters. 
They may give the appearance of partiality if their own State is 
implicated, as is to be expected, and they may not permit adequate 
representation of other States with an interest in the question.118 Lord 
Bingham was undoubtedly right in expressing these reservations, which 
are shared by others as well. One might add that domestic courts, 
despite their best efforts (e.g., through consistent interpretation), may in 
the end feel compelled to disregard international law in favor of the 
contrary law of the State, despite any demands that international law 
makes on them as the “natural” judges of international law.  
However, a number of points serve to ameliorate any cause for 
alarm. First of all, any domestic court decision that exercised the 
domestic court’s international judicial function can be overruled by the 
agreement of States. This agreement may also be expressed in their 
institution of an international court to finally resolve an international 
dispute:  the international court is instituted as the supervisory 
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mechanism over domestic courts’ exercise of their international judicial 
function.119 The ICJ proceedings between Germany and Italy again 
serve as a case in point, as do, among others, the proceedings between 
Belgium and Switzerland on the Jurisdiction and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,120 the Certain Property 
case,121 the ELSI case,122 the Barcelona Traction case,123 and the 
Guardianship of Infants case.124 State reactions to the SS Lotus judgment 
of the PCIJ,125 or to the South West Africa judgment of the ICJ,126 
remind us further that even international courts are supervised, this time 
by States in a decentralized manner. State agreement can overrule the 
exercise of the international judicial function even by the “principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations.”127  
Second, domestic courts only rarely get to exercise their 
international judicial function with respect to pure State-to-State 
disputes. Far more often they will have to deal with international 
disputes (i.e., disputes implicating international law), which are not 
between States, but rather between other “users” of international law 
(and States).128 While these disputes may evolve or “mature” into State-
to-State disputes (viz., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, as well as 
Barcelona Traction) they will not be presented as such before the 
domestic court. This is because of the augmenting international 
regulation through the adoption of “inward-looking” norms, which 
require implementation within the domestic jurisdiction and thus bring 
domestic courts to the forefront of the international judicial function.  
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Third, and most importantly, it is true and it has been highlighted 
throughout this article, that domestic courts can be seen as violating 
international law as much as they can be seen as enforcing or 
developing it when discharging an international judicial function. For 
example, much criticism has targeted the ECJ’s decision in Kadi. One 
of its most notable critics was indeed the General Court of the European 
Union (GCEU) in Kadi II,129 even if the GCEU’s criticism was implicit 
and even if the General Court did finally follow the ECJ. Like the U.K. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ahmed, Kadi was seen as demonstrating a 
regression by adopting a sharp distinction between the “domestic” and 
the international legal order, akin to that adopted by U.S. courts for 
example in Sanchez-Llamas,130 and Medellín.131 Both sets of cases rely 
on domestic norms of constitutional rank to defeat international 
obligations. 
A distinction can be drawn, however, on the basis of an argument 
relating to “deeply internationalized” constitutional norms. The 
domestic provisions relied on by the ECJ and the U.K. Supreme Court, 
which safeguard the right to a fair trial in its various aspects (access to a 
court, access to an effective remedy, right to be heard), are mirrored in 
substance in international law, which guarantees these aspects of the 
right to a fair trial (e.g., in Article 14 of the International Convention of 
Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and also in customary international law).132 Much like 
the District Court of Jerusalem argued in Eichmann that Eichmann’s 
crimes were not solely crimes under Israeli law,133 the Canadian Federal 
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Court claimed, in upholding the constitutional rights of a Canadian 
citizen subject to the 1267 regime, that these rights were not just rights 
under the relevant Canadian Charter, but also under international law.134 
This claim is in sharp contrast to the U.S. courts’ defense of a domestic 
procedural provision (the procedural default rule); or to the move in 
Oklahoma to amend the State Constitution in order to prohibit state 
courts from “considering international law or Sharia law” or indeed “the 
legal precepts of other nations or cultures,” without explaining why 
such a move was necessary.135 
As argued from the outset, the two basic and inseparable aspects of 
the international judicial function of domestic courts are that of dispute 
settlement/law enforcement and that of law-development. Jennings calls 
the court judgment, even of a domestic court, the “acid test” of 
enforcement, as it is in this form that the international obligation 
appears “not as a proposition of general law, but is applied to particular 
parties in the circumstances of a particular case.”136 Shany finds that the 
core function associated with the international judicial role is “the 
settlement of disputes by an independent and impartial body of judges 
through a legal procedure resulting in the application of international 
legal standards.”137 That is precisely what the decisions of domestic 
courts above (the ECJ and the U.K. Supreme Court) resulted in, even if 
they did not explicitly rely on international law. Their pronouncements 
were definitely judicial pronouncements “of one kind or another,” and 
they “resulted in” the application of standards that exist in the 
international legal order.   
Whatever arguments can be proffered to demonstrate that, in this 
last example—but also in general—domestic courts implement and 
develop, rather than violate, international law, can be more or less 
persuasive, but in the end they are a matter of speculation or 
construction. What counts (and what remains to be seen in the 
aforementioned example) is what the reaction of States will be:  in the 
final analysis, they have the power to stop these developments in their 
tracks by invoking the responsibility of those States with recalcitrant 
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courts. Yet, if they acquiesce, the decisions of these courts will stand 
and produce effects on the international plane.  
As Fitzmaurice stated in Barcelona Traction, “judicial 
pronouncements of one kind or another constitute the principal method 
by which the law can find some concrete measure of clarification and 
development.”138 It is conceded that he was talking about the value of 
obiter dicta by an international court, while domestic court decisions are 
mere facts from the perspective of international law. But, to put it as 
succinctly as Nollkaemper, “a court is a court;”139 and, as courts, 
domestic courts seem to be aware of their position and their power as 
far as the interpretation and development of law is concerned. Their 
adoption of a strong presumption of conformity and the concomitant 
principle of consistent interpretation furnishes them with a very elegant 
method in which to take up their position in the integrated architecture 
of an international judicial function and fulfill their role as the natural 
judges of international law. Claims at the international level become 
subsidiary, if they are available at all. This means that the international 
law question can effectively be raised and answered at the domestic 
level. When the outcome is deemed unsatisfactory, international 
procedures will be called upon to review the “facts” (including potential 
decisions of the domestic court) and determine whether a breach of an 
international obligation has taken place or whether the law has moved 
on. The process then at the international stage is merely subsidiary or 
supervisory; intervention will be limited to when the domestic process 
fails to address the issues appropriately and conform to the international 
obligation.140  
The blurring of the dividing lines between international and 
national norms has also blurred the dividing lines between international 
and national dispute settlement. This has led domestic courts to assume, 
even if by necessity, an international judicial function as part of their 
judicial function to decide disputes and thus enforce, but also develop, 
the law. Their international judicial function is assigned to them, or at 
least it is acknowledged, by international law with respect to both of its 
aspects. The blurring of the distinction between violation and 
enforcement, and between violation and development, which is in part 
due to the decentralized nature of the international legal order, 
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highlights the international judicial function of domestic courts, 
supervised in casu by their international counterparts, or—in the final 
analysis—by States. It shows domestic courts as an important cog in the 
machinery of dispute resolution and law-development, as the first—
”natural”—judge in the integrated architecture of an international 
judicial function.  
